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SEPTEMBER 5, 1955

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Washington Wire .... *T.R.B.*

"The spirit of Geneva" was systematically watered down last week by an Administration bucket brigade. The President and Vice President in effect warned against liking the Russians too much in speeches before the American Bar Association convention in Philadelphia. Unofficial explanations of their addresses making it clear that they were expressions of a considered change in the official American mood—if not actually in American foreign policy—were supplied to newspaper correspondents in Washington. It was made plain that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had been consulted, that US ambassadors in foreign capitals had been instructed to call the attention of world statesmen to the new line and that the despiriting of Geneva was considered a matter of the utmost importance.

What the President said in Philadelphia was not particularly startling. He pointed out that Germany was still divided, that the Soviet satellites were still satellites and that Moscow was still the capital of a worldwide movement to subvert capitalism and that this was more than a "cultural movement." The Geneva spirit was not an end in itself; it would prove genuine or spurious as it produced or failed to produce results more tangible than a mere improvement in diplomatic manners. All this was so obvious that off-the-record interpretation was needed—and it was forthcoming.

What the Administration was actually trying to do, it was explained, was to let both the Kremlin and members of the Western alliance know that Washington expected to achieve German reunification within the next two years—that this, basically, was its price for moderation of its cold warfare. It had no real expectation of persuading Moscow to free its satellites or of negotiating meaningful disarmament agreements in the foreseeable future. But if Germany could be reunified, the satellite problem might eventually take care of itself. For if East Germany were abandoned as a Soviet colony, Moscow could not long resist pressure for some measure of independence for Poland and the other subject nations. As for disarmament, the problems involved in the atomic age were so complex that they probably couldn't be solved. However, there would be a natural tendency for all nations to curtail armament spending if international relations improved in other areas.

Although the explanations were somewhat more enlightening than the Philadelphia speeches themselves, neither told the whole story of the Administration's second thoughts about Geneva. The fact was that Republican politicians had never quite trusted "the spirit of Geneva" and had become increasingly apprehensive about its implications as they observed the enthusiasm with which the American people embraced it. After two and a half years of highly satisfactory operation in a cold-war atmosphere, GOP strategists were not happy about the prospect of enforced adjustment to a warmer climate.

True, peace was a politically salable commodity, and at the moment it was the personal property of President Eisenhower. But what if peace got out of hand to the point where it interfered with prosperity, an even more important asset? What if Congress, imbued with the Geneva spirit, actually cut back on armament spending so precipitately that it put free enterprise to the test of sustaining the national economy at its present level without the kind of help it is now getting from the US Treasury? What if the people of the United States became so tolerant of Russia that the Administration's internal security policy looked even more cruelly ridiculous to them than it did now? What if politically important minorites from Middle Europe—the Poles concentrated in Great Lakes cities, for example—got the idea that peace was being purchased at the expense of hope of freedom for their homelands? What if too abrupt a transition from cold war to peace gave Sen. Joseph McCarthy a chance to ride back into a position of influence and power?

What Republican leaders had counted upon was a sure-thing campaign in 1956—a campaign featuring Eisenhower, peace and prosperity. But they had begun to wonder whether the effectiveness of the formula might not be weakened by introduction of too much peace. Obviously, there couldn't be too much Eisenhower or too much prosperity. The danger was that too much peace might not leave room for enough prosperity. It was to guard against this danger that some of Eisenhower's political advisers urged him to make the Philadelphia speech.

They probably didn't couch their arguments in such crass political terms. They didn't have to. The President is no longer the political innocent he is generally presumed to be. He fully understands that national prosperity has more to do with his high Gallup rating than the color of his eyes, the contagion of his smile or even his unquestionably sincere devotion to the cause of world peace.

He likewise understands that it is politically useful to have the Joint Chiefs of Staff insist, as they do, that national defense spending cannot safely be cut below the present level of $34 billion a year.

One of the men he listened to most attentively while preparing his Philadelphia address was Admiral Arthur Radford, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

It cannot be said at this point that Republican leaders are running scared. But they are worried about still-declining farm income, about Congressional investigations of the Administration's big-business friends and its security policies, now getting under way, and about the disrupted condition of party machinery in several key states where they must do well if they are to win back control of Congress next year.

They are even bothered a little by such elusive indications of disenchantment with Eisenhower as answers to the recent Gallup Poll question: "If Franklin D. Roosevelt were alive today and running for a second term against Dwight D. Eisenhower, which candidate would you like to see win?" Fifty percent said Roosevelt; 45 percent said Eisenhower, the other 5 percent were in doubt.

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BEHIND THE HEADLINES

Toast to Friendship—With a Dash of Bitters

LIKE SAILBOATERS who lean suddenly into the squalling wind to keep their craft from upending, President Eisenhower and Vice President Nixon shifted their weight unexpectedly against the "Geneva spirit," and talked gruffly again about Russian intransigence. The "friendly but firm" American policy had become mostly firm. The boat was still heading in the same direction, but the shift of wind made the crew lean in the opposite direction. Here are some of the developments that caused the shift:

1. Communists in Eastern Europe have distributed great quantities of photographs of a smiling Bulganin and a smiling Eisenhower, with the propaganda inference that if these opposing leaders have kissed and are going together, what good is it any longer for restless satellites to agitate?

2. In Italy the same smiling photographs carry the message that if Eisenhower is profoundly convinced of the Soviet desire for peace, why should not Italians accept the Italian Communist leader, Palmiro Togliatti, on the same basis?

3. Chancellor Adenauer's government in West Germany has been seriously disadvantaged by the post-Geneva honeymoon. Since Adenauer must travel to Moscow for negotiations during September, he quietly implored the American Government to restate its insistence upon a united Germany. (Both Eisenhower and Nixon fulfilled this request in their speeches before the American Bar Association.)

4. Among members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, there is a growing suspicion that the Geneva spirit has relaxed not only the tensions but the vigilance against Communist threats.

5. Here in America the picketing of the Russian farm delegation by Americans of Ukrainian extraction served to remind the Administration about the bitterness in the hearts of millions of Americans whose parents or grandparents came from Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and other satellite lands.

6. Even the eagerness with which Americans greeted Secretary of the Treasury George Humphrey's remarks about a balanced budget in 1956, and the possibility of a tax cut, must have chilled Administration leaders. For the hopes are based in part on the false assumption that a real thaw has set in, which will permit sizable savings in the defense budget, a possibility still remote.

It was developments like these that caused the President and Vice President to counteract the wholly happy spirit of Geneva, and to resurrect some of the harsh realism of the pre-Geneva era. Nixon went further than the President when he called on the Russians to prove their sincerity by:

1. Accepting free elections and unification in Germany and Korea;
2. Accepting President Eisenhower's aerial inspection plan;
3. Doing away with the Iron Curtain;
4. Freeing the satellites; and
5. Abolishing Moscow-trained organizations in other countries.

This seeming about-face of the United States Government reflects a change in psychology rather than policy, for a careful review of the past five weeks will uncover not a single policy change, either Russian or American, on any issue discussed at Geneva. The barriers have been partially relaxed for the movement of people and ideas, and deportment of officials has been more polite, but no significant policy change can yet be credited to the Geneva spirit.

This conclusion applies to disarmament, despite the announcement by the Russians that they are cutting back their ground troops by 640,000 men before the end of the year, and a similar announcement by Czechoslovakia that it is cutting 34,000 from its army.

There is obvious self-interest in these decisions, even if accepted at face value. Both announcements were made as harvest-time approaches, and the shortage of agricultural labor undoubtedly was a contributing factor. The Russian cutback would be part of the reorganization of the Russian army to employ tactical atomic weapons, a process that requires fewer men, more highly trained, more mobile in transport, and equipped with much more costly arms. This decision fits well with the display in Moscow this spring of new Soviet jet bombers capable of intercontinental flight, and of a variety of new jet fighters which would tax the Soviet defense budget.

It is a fact that both the Soviet Union and the United States have pressed forward in the arms race since Geneva. Each is better able today than it was in July to destroy the vital heartland of the other. Each has launched scientific development and armament production programs that will not show full results for three or four years; defense officials are thus gambling that there will be no real slackening of the Cold War in that period.

Air Force Assistant Secretary Trevor Gardner announced a "major breakthrough" in aircraft development since Geneva, and the decision of the Administration to ask another $100 million for Air Force research during the present fiscal year. This is the fourth increase in research funds since the revelation of new Soviet types of bombers and fighters in the Moscow fly-bys last April.

In late August the Air Force also announced that it was increasing by 50 percent its observation posts in the United States which watch for enemy planes, and was assigning one-third more personnel to the domestic alarm system.

These developments do not necessarily mean that Geneva was a futile exercise, and that its spirit is dead. Instead it means that the "phony peace" is over and the "period of negotiation" is about to begin. The phrases are from James Reston of the *New York Times*, who has been one of the keenest observers of the shift.

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The period of negotiation will be focused at the New York disarmament talks, which are expected to last through the first two or three weeks of September; then the UN General Assembly session, which opens at New York on September 20; finally the Foreign Ministers' Conference which will begin October 27. Each of these sessions will subject the Russians to the test of tangible agreement, not pleasant platitudes. And each of the Western powers too will be forced to show how far it is willing to go toward a settlement with the Russians.

By Christmas the "period of negotiation" should provide a clue to the real progress at the Summit.

The Future of American Atomic Supremacy

THE three-week talks on the peaceful atom suggested a fresh need for national humility, for every one of the six leading nations in the atomic field found that it had been guilty of earlier boasts of superiority which were not borne out by the findings of the Geneva Conference.

Many nations which had looked exclusively to the United States for help in catching up in the atomic field found startling revelations in the Soviet resources at the Conference, and the possibilities of Soviet assistance.

Against this background, the atomic scientists who remain in Geneva could muster only wry smiles at the report Atomic Energy Chairman Lewis L. Strauss made to President Eisenhower on his return from Geneva: The United States is "clearly ahead" of the Soviet Union in atomic power, Strauss announced. No doubt technical evidence can be adduced to support the statement, but it is in contrast to the sobering, humbling experience of scientists who found their proudest achievements had been equalled by others.

Strauss did acknowledge that "the Russians are very competent scientists" and that "there is no monopoly of scientific talent in the United States."

Europeans were impressed by the report of another American delegate, Rep. Melvin Price (D, Ill.) who warned Americans "not to delude themselves into thinking leadership in peaceful use of nuclear power will automatically be ours." Price in his written report on the Conference said it will require "all the resources, all the ingenuity and all the boldness at our command" to maintain supremacy in the atomic field.

Politically, the great achievement of the Geneva atomic conference was to make very difficult, if not impossible, any return to isolationism either in Moscow or in Washington. Knowledge once given cannot be taken back, and there is therefore no possible retreat from Geneva. The reestablishment of lines of communication between scientists makes difficult any effective breaking off of contact between politicians and statesmen.

In this sense the Geneva atomic conference has done more than any other international gathering since World War II to break the limiting patterns inherited by the world community from that conflict and from the Cold War which followed. For the heart of the matter is not faith and confidence where there was, and still is, fear and distrust; it is the restoration to their proper places of the facts and knowledge which can alone reduce or even counteract the irrationalities. Of 1,067 long scientific documents submitted by 73 nations, only 450 were read; but more than 16,000 pages of documents (in a single one of the four official languages) were distributed and the verbatim record of the proceedings (in one language) runs to more than 3,000 pages.

Atomic energy calls for planning, national and international. A single and most significant example is the problem of the genetical effects of radiation. We know little about them but enough to fear them; we know also that only carefully planned and carried out international co-operative research and action can protect all of us—and, even more, can save future generations from the deleterious mutations of genes.

In industrially advanced countries where the conventional sources of power are beginning to run out or are likely to during the next 25 to 50 years, the only answer can be national planning. Here, Britain is the best example. Thanks to perhaps the most daring and vigorous national program in the world, some 40 percent of the total electrical power requirements in 1975 will be satisfied by nuclear power, replacing the need for some 40 million tons of coal a year.

In countries on the threshold of the modernization of their economy, international planning is necessary. As a matter of fact, for rather a long time to come, the needs of such countries—in such areas as the training of technicians and in experimentation—will have to be met through outside help. At present, the Soviet Union is helping Red China, Poland, East Germany, Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary. The US is providing isotopes to 47 countries; courses for foreign students from almost as many; enriched uranium and heavy water to a few countries; and we have bilateral agreements with 25 countries, with more in view.

From the European point of view, another significant political effect of the

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

US shows a reactor at Geneva

conference was a broadening of the boundaries of what has come to be known as Western Europe. In fact, the phrase was always a misnomer; to call six nations—France, Italy, West Germany, Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg—"Western Europe" was plainly a geographical falsification. There is an atomic "Little Europe" of "the six," with Britain as an "observer." It is a species of study and development, centered in Brussels, and created at the Palermo conference as an inner-section of the European Coal and Steel Authority—the Schuman plan. But the French are in the lead in a movement to break it away, to make it both independent, and broader in geographical construction.

At the same time, there are two other atomic "Europes." The first is EURATOM, the Council of the European Atomic Energy Society, created a bit more than a year ago on Norwegian and British initiative. EURATOM has eight members, all representing not governments but national atomic-energy authorities or organizations: Britain, France, Italy, Belgium, Holland, Sweden, Norway, Switzerland.

Then there is the CERN—the French initials of the European Committee for Nuclear Research, the first international body in the atomic field. Twelve nations signed a pact formally creating CERN as a basic research organization in July, 1953: Britain, France, Italy, Switzerland, Greece, Yugoslavia, West Germany, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Belgium and Holland. As a result of the Geneva conference, Spain, Poland and Czechoslovakia are slated to become members, probably before the reactor at Geneva starts operating at the end of next year.

Thus, thanks to the atom and its conference, Western Europe begins to take on true meaning and to make sense, geographically and, perhaps also, politically.

Geneva PERCY WINNER

The Men With Friends in High Places

THE LOBBIES have recorded their expenditures for the first half of 1954, and the diligent *NR* reader will find nothing surprising in the reports of the largest spenders, as listed on the chart below.

The Transportation Association of America, made up of railroad, waterway and trucker interests, zealously fought "all trends which may lead to government ownership or operation of any form of transportation."

The American Tariff League labored successfully to weaken the Reciprocal Trade Act by raising tariffs on bicycles and Swiss watches. The influence of the National Association of Electric Companies was used to oppose public power projects around the country and to encourage the Department of the Interior (which needed little encouragement) to carry on the war against electric co-ops.

The General Gas Committee co-ordinated the unsuccessful maneuvers of the natural gas producers to get themselves exempted from federal regulation.

And the CIO spent its money on trying to block the moves of all of them.

The comparatively low expenditures reported by the lobbies for the first half of this year—$362,341.27 less than in the corresponding period of 1954—is not due to any relaxation by the assorted pressure groups to influence legislation. The smaller figures are the result of last year's decision by the Supreme Court which upheld the constitutionality of the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act but interpreted its scope very narrowly. The court ruled that the law applied only to persons who have received contributions for the specific purpose of influencing federal legislation; furthermore, these individuals must have tried to accomplish their goals by direct communication with members of Congress.

This "direct communication" requirement disturbed Justices Black and Douglas who wrote in a dissenting opinion:

> Congress was concerned with the raising of money to aid in the passage or defeat of legislation, whatever tactics were used. . . . To influence "directly" the passage or defeat of legislation includes any number of methods—for example, nationwide radio, television or advertising programs promoting a particular measure, as well as the button-holing of Congressmen. To include the latter while excluding the former is to rewrite the Act.

Some realistic rewriting of the Act in the light of the Supreme Court decision has been done by Sen. John F. Kennedy (D, Mass.), and hearings on it are due to be held when Congress reconvenes. As things stand now, such prominent lobbying groups as the American Medical Association, the American Petroleum Institute, and the Chamber of Commerce all question whether the lobby registration law applies to their activities at all.

Top Lobby Spending
FIRST HALF -- 1955

TRANSPORTATION ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA	$227,011 *
AMERICAN TARIFF LEAGUE	$153,586
NATL' ASSOCIATION OF ELECTRIC COMPANIES	$ 70,687
GENERAL GAS COMMITTEE	$ 67,851
CIO	$ 66,809

TOTAL LOBBY SPENDING ⇨ $2,187,011

* TAA SAID LAW REQUIRED REPORT ON ONLY 1% OF THIS AMOUNT

Big Bark, No Bite!

EDWARD F. HOWREY, the out-going chairman of the Federal Trade Commission, has made a number of speeches and public statements over the past two years crediting himself with mobilizing the FTC to dam the rising wave of business mergers. This is no mean task for FTC. Some 522 corporate mergers have been made in recent years by combines having more than $50 million in assets. Twenty-two big firms have, in effect, taken over 244 smaller ones; two dairy food corporations alone have gobbled up 65 former competitors between them. But despite Mr. Howrey's brave words, the FTC has not issued a single anti-merger complaint this year. As of February, 1955, only about six percent of the Commission's expenditures for the

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fiscal year had been devoted to anti-merger work.

FTC publicity hand-outs state proudly that 30 cease-and-desist orders were issued in anti-monopoly cases during fiscal 1955, as compared to 24 per year from 1950-1954. The publicity statements do not mention that 18 of these were worked out in co-operation with the alleged law violators themselves. The FTC record-setters also report that they issued 36 new merger complaints, as compared to an average of 29 new complaints during the four previous years. The question here is whether the complaints have been issued against big firms or little ones. Mr. Howrey has not been obliging about releasing figures on the size of the companies he is prosecuting.

As a former FTC commissioner puts it: "It is very easy to make out a case of great activity if you do not differentiate the elephants from the rabbits."

It would be surprising if Mr. Howrey showed himself to be very enthusiastic about getting after the elephants considering that he served as a member of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study Antitrust Laws, put FTC personnel to work assisting the Committee, and then signed its final report—which turned out to be a long list of recommendations for weakening the laws that the FTC is supposed to enforce. This astonished nobody, since the committee itself was made up almost exclusively of lawyers who specialize in defending big business clients indicted under these same laws—as Mr. Howrey himself used to do in private life; indeed half the attorneys were actually involved in pending cases while they were drawing up their report—with Mr. Howrey's assistance.

In the words of the House Small Business Committee which has been looking into the activities of the FTC under Mr. Howrey, "Investigations to date have revealed that if the top management of the Federal Trade Commission . . . (has) not demonstrated injudicious leanings in favor of big business, these officials have demonstrated at least a lack of candor in accounting to Congressional committees, and to the public generally, for their stewardship."

Peace Between Israel and Her Neighbors

SECRETARY OF STATE DULLES displayed dynamic American leadership—the kind of leadership for which this nation was noted during the period 1947-50—when he offered his proposals last week for an Arab-Jewish settlement. The peace proposals were made in a speech before a New York City audience, and were of intense interest to Americans of Jewish faith, but the proposals did not merit the accusation of some Arab leaders that they were merely gimmicks to influence American voters in the 1956 elections.

Mr. Dulles identified three remaining roots of controversy in the Arab-Israel region, and suggested international aid in settling each of them, including a generous contribution from the United States.

Problem 1. An estimated 900,000 Arab refugees, driven out of present Israel territory during the 1948-1949 fighting, are still encamped outside Israeli borders. They demand the right to resettle in Israel, or to receive just compensation. Israel has denied their claims, and in any case could not pay the compensation now. Mr. Dulles offered to arrange an international loan, out of which Israel would pay compensation to the refugees.

Problem 2. Israel and her four Arab neighbors—Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and Egypt—have each feared attack by the other to alter the 1949 truce line. Mr. Dulles now offers a treaty guarantee to each side that the United States will help protect it against attack by the other side. Such a guarantee would require consent by the US Senate. Britain and France have both offered to join in the guarantee.

Problem 3. The improvement of livelihood for both Arab and Jew will depend to an important degree upon increased irrigation. This requires agreement among the nations on the joint use of international waters, and construction of major engineering works. Rivers must be dammed, wells drilled and ponds constructed to catch seasonal runoff of rains. Ambassador Eric Johnston has represented President Eisenhower for several years in seeking an agreement on a comprehensive water scheme for the Jordan River, but each time agreement appears near political controversy has delayed action. Now Mr. Dulles is renewing the American offer of help of water development, but coupling it with the relaxation of political tensions.

The three Dulles proposals showed a keen regard for the role of the UN. Secretary General Hammarskjold is generally credited with preventing the outbreak of war over Israel on several occasions in the past year, through the persistent action of the UN truce teams on the spot. Mr. Dulles now proposes that any of the settlement proposals might be administered by the UN.

Mr. Dulles was understandably evasive in discussing the background for his peace proposals, because such an explanation might prejudice the willingness of one side or the other to negotiate. But three recent developments have obviously worried the American policy makers.

First, while military incidents were declining along the Israeli borders touching Jordan, Syria and Lebanon, there has been a rapid deterioration of relations between Israel and Egypt. Hundreds of civilians have been killed in raids and counter-raids. And the recent Israeli election campaign appeared to encourage the extremists. Premier Nasser of Egypt has personally joined in the name calling.

Second, the Soviet Union has been actively offering its aid to Arab countries, including delivery of heavy arms. The Soviet invitation to the Egyptian premier for a visit to Moscow was accepted with an enthusiasm clearly directed at Western eyes. The opportunity for the Soviets to stir trouble in the region is made possible by the existence of Arab-Israeli tension.

Third, any local fighting, however small, now poses the threat of intervention by outsiders, and gradual enlargement into a nuclear conflict.

For these reasons it was clearly to the interest of the United States for Mr. Dulles to proffer a constructive settlement before Arab-Israeli relations were further inflamed. But beyond that Mr. Dulles showed a kind of dynamism which American policy has lacked in the Near East since the Greek-Turkish aid program began in 1947, and the Palestine Truce was signed in 1949.

Initial reactions to the Dulles proposals naturally came from the extremists, who were critical, and could not in any case be won to a middle course. But among responsible leaders there will undoubtedly be serious consideration. American policy officers have said frankly in the past that an Arab-Jewish settlement can come about only by a plan

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which would be rejected first by the Israelis, then sold to the Arabs, and finally accepted by the Israelis, under outside pressure.

The Israelis have not yet spoken.

Hands Across the Curtain

MOSLEM leaders have asserted throughout the Cold War that people of their religious faith are impervious to Communism because of the teachings of the Koran. Yet an outsider gauging a Russian threat in the Near East must recall that the Soviet Union contains several Socialist Republics which are wholly Moslem in religion, governed by Moslem Communists. The Chinese Red Army in the 1930's, 20 years before it conquered China, contained several Moslem divisions led by Moslem officers who were Communists, and all Moslem provinces in Communist China are now reportedly governed by Moslem Communists.

Even in such countries as Afghanistan (wholly Moslem) and Indonesia (largely Moslem) Communist agents have demonstrated they can find local Moslem grievances which they can exploit for Communist purposes.

Of the world's 300 million believers in Allah, about a quarter live within the Communist bloc—in fact 50 million in Communist China alone—and the rest are found mainly in the "Koran Belt" which stretches across North Africa, through the Arabic-speaking countries, to Pakistan and Indonesia. These last two, despite their distance from Mecca, have the largest populations.

The Egyptian Minister of Religious Foundations recently set out from Cairo to tour Moslem communities in Communist China, reportedly to check on rumors of Communist persecution. But the story the Minister told on his return was full of praise for Communist China and appropriate of the post-Geneva era.

Moslems in Red China are a model group and set an example for the rest of the Islamic world, the Minister said in a written statement. Communist authorities have interfered with Moslem life only to the extent of abolishing polygamy and insisting that women be given equal rights. Chinese Moslem women can be "envied by women in the Near East," the Minister said. They initiate divorce proceedings. They cannot be divorced arbitrarily by their husbands. And they can dance with men in public. The Minister felt self-conscious about this last observation, for he added: Dancing in China is both healthier and happier than the "belly dance"—which is the only dance performed by Egyptian women, "depraved women at that." Chinese moral standards are so high, the Minister said, that he did not dare describe the "belly dance" to them.

On behalf of the Egyptian Government, the Minister is now pressing Saudi Arabia to grant entry visas to Moslems from Communist China who wish to make the next pilgrimage to Mecca.

The Soviet Union also has notified Saudi Arabia that it wishes to increase the flow of pilgrims among its Moslem citizens, most of whom live in the Socialist Republics of Central Asia.

This hands-across-the-curtain spirit is not without politics, both ways.

Rhee

Rayburn

Adenauer

George

Eisenhower in the Age of Aging Men

BEFORE Democratic campaign strategists begin repeating those ominous statistics which prove that Mr. Eisenhower, if re-elected, will reach an unprecedented 70 years of age during his second term, they might do well to have a look at the trend of things over the past century. Dr. Harvey C. Lehman, a psychologist at Ohio University, has done just this and has concluded that everybody is older these days—and public figures are older than everybody else.

Take generals, for instance. Lafayette was fighting the American Revolution—as a Major-General—at 20, and Kosciuszko had made a name for himself before his 30th birthday. The average age of top-ranking soldiers during the revolution was not quite 40. By the Civil War, this had gone up to almost 50. The run-of-the-mill, World War II four-star commander was verging on 59.

Nor have civilians retained their youth while the hard-pressed military man was turning grey. Representatives in Congress were, on the average, 20 years older in 1925 than they were in 1825 and Senators put on 15 years between those dates. In the last century more than half the speakers of the House were under 40. Between 1900 and 1940, however, the speaker's age hovered around an elderly 67.

Moving to the executive branch of government—getting closer to the President all the time—we find that Cabinet members have grown 14 years older since the turn of the century. Between 1925 and 1945 the average Secretary of State registered a heavy 68.50 years of age.

It is true that Mr. Eisenhower, at 70, would be our oldest President by the end of his second term, but Averell Harriman, who will be 69 in November, 1960, could also be a candidate for this distinction. Russia's Bulganin is 70 already. Winston Churchill traveled a decade beyond this mark before he gave over his place to Anthony Eden, a stripling of 58. Syngman Rhee shows no signs of reduced vigor at 80 and can still stir up a spontaneous demonstration at short notice. In a matter of weeks Konrad Adenauer will celebrate his 80th birthday. Not only does the President have a decade and a half advantage on these latter two heads of state, but whereas the world nervously awaits their naming of a successor, the Republican line of succession is now established—Richard Nixon, 42 years old, waits in the wings.

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Revolt in Georgia

THE SOUTH'S angry resentment over the Supreme Court's decree outlawing racial segregation in public schools has apparently reached the point of judicial revolt against the power and dignity of the Court.

This is the primary conclusion to be drawn from the recent action of the Georgia Supreme Court in refusing to obey a mandate of the high federal court to reconsider a murder conviction. The case itself has no relationship to the school segregation decisions. But the violence of the Georgia court's reaction to the Supreme Court's assertion of jurisdiction in the case and its insulting and patronizing references to the high tribunal are explainable in terms of a deep-seated antagonism toward the Supreme Court arising out of the segregation ruling. And the very violence of the state court's rebuke to the supremacy of the Supreme Court may well create an important and celebrated constitutional crisis bearing a direct relationship to the Court's ultimate power to enforce its anti-segregation decrees.

Immediately involved is Aubry Williams, a Georgia Negro under sentence of death for the murder of a white man. Following Williams' trial and conviction in 1953, his attorney moved for a new trial on the ground that there had been discrimination against Negroes in the selection of the jury in violation of the 14th Amendment to the federal Constitution. The Georgia courts denied the motion on the ground that the objection came too late, that it should have been raised before the trial started. The Supreme Court of the United States then reviewed the case. In a carefully considered opinion, that Court determined that it had jurisdiction over the proceeding but that the case should be remanded to the Georgia Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of certain extraordinary circumstances. Chief among those circumstances was the oral admission by Georgia before the Supreme Court that the Williams' jury had in fact been unconstitutionally impaneled.

Upon remand, the Georgia court denied that the Supreme Court had any jurisdiction over the case and flatly refused to give the reconsideration to the case that the Court had ordered. It accused the Supreme Court of failing to observe the Tenth Amendment and of invading exclusively state jurisdiction. It denied that the higher court had rendered any judgment which it could constitutionally recognize and asserted that it would not "supinely surrender sovereign powers of this state."

A basic challenge has thus been raised to the constitutional authority of the Supreme Court and to the finality of its determination as to its jurisdiction. As long ago as 1816, in the historic case of *Martin* v. *Hunter's Lessee*, the Court laid down the principle, so fundamental to the federal form of government, that it has appellate jurisdiction over all cases in state courts involving federal constitutional or statutory claims. To hold otherwise would permit 48 different interpretations of such claims by the various state courts, and the uniformity and supremacy of the federal Constitution would be destroyed. Since 1816, when Virginia's judiciary questioned this doctrine, no state tribunal has ever breathed a judicial doubt on the subject or declined to obey a mandate of the Supreme Court. There is no reason to believe that the Supreme Court will now ignore or evade the crude challenge of the Georgia court.

Welfare Programs in the Politics of '56

WHEN Congress adjourned, Congressional Quarterly News Service asked all members to list the 1956 election issues in the order of their probable importance. Replies from more than half the members show little disagreement on issue No. 1: taxes and federal spending. Other issues crowding close behind concern domestic prosperity and welfare. These include farm price supports, highways, school aid, polio vaccine, social security and health insurance. (Two years ago a similar survey by *Congressional Quarterly* predicted the Korean War would be the No. 1 issue, followed by other foreign policy questions.)

The GOP record on these domestic issues in '56 will depend largely on the performance of the New York Republican, Marion B. Folsom, who took over on August 1 as Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare. He succeeded the Texas Democrat, Oveta Culp Hobby.

The contrast between these two welfare officers—Mrs. Hobby and Mr. Folsom—suggests not only a wide difference in professional competence but also a shift in Republican tactics. President Eisenhower, it will be recalled, appointed two Democrats to his Cabinet, just as Franklin Roosevelt had chosen two Republicans as Secretaries of War and Navy at the beginning of World War II, and Herbert Hoover had selected a Democrat, William D. Mitchell, as Attorney General to enforce the unpopular prohibition laws.

Eisenhower's experiment with a mixed-party Cabinet is not a happy one. The Labor Secretary, Martin Durkin, lasted less than a year, and Mrs. Hobby left after 30 months, amidst great public debate over her program. Neither was able to gather bipartisan support for his Department, as Henry L. Stimson and Frank Knox had done in wartime.

Selection of Marion Folsom represents a new Republican approach. An adviser to Democratic Administrations for 20 years, Folsom is respected and admired for his competence in those fields which the Democrats regard as their specialty. Folsom was one of the fathers of the social security program in 1935, and an adviser on each of its later revisions. As an Eastman Kodak executive, he rebuffed the American Medical Association when he set up a company health insurance plan, and tangled with the US Chamber of Commerce when he laid out Eastman's "socialistic" retirement plan.

Democratic friends of Folsom—and he has many—regard him as scholarly, a little shy, a thoroughly competent insurance technician, and a man of moral courage. His greatest shortcoming, they feel, is a doctrinaire opposition to federal grants, a subject on which he has shown himself as conservative as his Cabinet colleague, George Humphrey. Nevertheless, his expert sponsorship of changes in welfare legislation could wreck Democratic hopes of exploiting welfare issues in 1956. Here is how three of those issues stand today.

Social security: Since passage of the first Social Security Act in 1935, Democrats have taken credit for the gradual extension of old-age coverage to nine out of ten jobs in America, and substantial increases in benefits.

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President Eisenhower in his 1955 State of the Union message recommended a further broadening of coverage but submitted no legislation. Democrats scooped up the loose ball. In the House they pushed through a bill, over Secretary Hobby's opposition, to extend social security coverage to professional persons, except physicians, to lower the retirement age for women from 65 to 62, and to pay pensions to disabled persons at age 50. This bill awaits Senate action in January.

Secretary Folsom lost no time in reversing his Department's position on that bill. In his first public speech as Secretary, he turned his back on Mrs. Hobby's position, and went the Democrats one better by urging that coverage be extended to all government workers as well as professional people. And he said he expected Congressional action in 1956.

Senate Democrats, led by Senators Lehman (N.Y.) and Morse (Ore.), expect to raise Mr. Folsom's bid, probably in the amounts of benefits. This political rivalry is likely to give the country close to 100 percent coverage by social security in 1956.

School construction aid: A national survey by state school administrators in 1954 concluded that the nation must spend on classrooms $3 billion a year for 10 years to keep ahead of the present tidal wave of children.

During 1953 and 1954 the Eisenhower Administration postponed action on federal aid, insisting that any long-range program must await a White House Conference on School Aid, now scheduled for November, 1955. But the clamor from the states reached such a pitch that the President reversed himself last February, and sent to Congress an interim program offering $220 million in federal grants to impoverished school districts over a three-year period. The rest of the burden would continue to fall on state and local authorities, with federal help only in floating local bonds.



Marion B. Folsom

Congressional Democrats called the President's program "skimpy" and drafted their own legislation for $1.6 billion in federal matching funds over a four-year period. This bill was voted out of the House Committee, with Democrats 15-2 in favor, the Republicans 7-6 against.

After that vote President Eisenhower apparently switched his support to the Democratic bill, for he included this on his list of "must" legislation awaiting Congressional action on June 30. Secretary Folsom has as yet made no public comment on school construction aid, but it appears likely that he will support a larger program than Mrs. Hobby did. Just how large could become an election issue.

Federal health insurance: For two years Secretary Hobby tried to interest Congress in a scheme under which the federal government would pay 76 percent of the "abnormal losses" suffered by private insurance companies on health policies. The insurance companies were lukewarm and Congress tepid. No bill on the subject came out of committee, although this scheme was called the keystone of the Eisenhower health program.

Secretary Folsom in his first press interview said he was taking a "new look" at health reinsurance, and that he would have recommendations ready for the President's State of the Union message next January. He implied the Hobby insurance program was dead.

Discussing his personal views, he outlined two health needs of the nation which might well become Administration proposals. One is a new type of private Blue Cross or Blue Shield policy which would protect individuals against "catastrophic illness." As under automobile collision insurance, the policy holder might absorb the first $100 of medical cost, then be reimbursed by the company for three-fourths of the additional cost up to $10,000.

Mr. Folsom's other idea is the extension of existing state insurance schemes under which nearly seven out of ten persons in the United States now can draw income while sick. The Secretary said if all states would enact such laws, that would provide the most fundamental type of illness protection.

Neither of these schemes involve federal contributions but the Secretary indicated he is studying what the role of the federal government could be in bringing about such additional health coverage.

As the nation's top welfare officer, Folsom becomes the point of collision between two great public pressures.

One is the pressure for less federal spending and maximum local services. Secretary of the Treasury George Humphrey has been the leading crusader in the Eisenhower Cabinet for this viewpoint. And Marion Folsom, as Under-Secretary of the Treasury during 1953-1955, sat at George Humphrey's elbow, the technician who worked out many of Humphrey's proposals for approaching a balanced budget.

But there has been a countervailing public pressure for more federal aid in areas of public service which are failing to keep up with population growth. The upsurge of population has become explosive compared to the capacity of our schools, hospitals and roads. These services will require public investment and support at a higher level than has been regarded as normal heretofore. There are a growing number of people, including many in Congress, who believe this larger public expenditure can only come from the federal government because it alone has the capacity to raise the revenues.

If this viewpoint prevails, the nation is going up to "a new plateau of federal expenditure," to use Walter Lippmann's phrase. But such a course would be in the opposite direction from the fiscal policy now applied by the Eisenhower Cabinet.

Thus Secretary Folsom will be torn in two directions—to support, on the one hand, the fiscal "clamp-down-the-lid" policy which he helped to fashion in the Treasury; on the other, to press forward toward higher levels of personal welfare and security, in which he deeply believes, and which would almost certainly involve higher federal expenditures.

The kind of compromise he finds within himself in this dilemma will determine how much he will undercut the Democratic appeal to the voters in 1956 on such welfare issues as social security, health insurance and school construction aid. He has already begun to win back political yardage lost by the Republicans under his predecessor, Mrs. Hobby.

HALDORE HANSON

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BUSINESSMEN IN GOVERNMENT—II

The Divided Loyalties of Public Servants

BUSINESSMEN traditionally are called to Washington when a war starts and are sent back home when it ends. But they were not sent home after the signing of the Korean truce. The Washington climate had changed. Where President Truman had blown hot and cold at the businessmen — condemning them in 1944, sending them packing in 1947 after World War II and recalling them in 1950—President Eisenhower smiled kindly and consistently upon them. He demonstrated his trust and his admiration by making up his Cabinet very largely of men drawn from the country's big corporations: Charles Wilson, George Humphrey, Sinclair Weeks, Harold Talbott. In his appointments to the independent regulatory agencies, Mr. Eisenhower acted on the principle that men from the industries to be regulated would make the best regulators. A telephone lawyer was made chairman of the Federal Communications Commission. A utilities lawyer became chairman of the Federal Power Commission. Corporation lawyers took over as members of the National Labor Relations Board and the Federal Trade Commission. A lawyer for brokerage houses was named chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission.

The businessmen on loan to the government "without compensation"—the WOCs—found their services more in demand than ever as part-time consultants and received new encouragement from the Administration in October, 1953, when Secretary of Commerce Sinclair Weeks announced the establishment of the Business and Defense Services Administration to take over the duties of the expired National Production Authority. Twenty-five industry divisions were set up to oversee defense production, mobilization preparedness and services to private enterprise. Fifteen of these are headed by men on loan from the industries concerned, still on the payrolls of those industries.

The Republican Secretary of Commerce also kept in existence the Business Advisory Council, set up in 1933 and composed of important corporation executives, which meets six times a year and operates in a most informal way. It has no statutory or executive order authority; it spends about $70,000 a year and is financed entirely by its 60 members; its meetings are secret. All that is known about this "most exclusive country club in the United States" is that it makes recommendations to the Commerce Department on important economic issues. Members spend an estimated $5,000 a year each for the upkeep of the Council and for its six annual outings—in Washington and at expensive holiday resorts—to which they usually take their wives.

It is impossible to pin down the specific recommendations of the BAC or to measure its influence. Certainly its membership — past and present — includes some of the shiniest names in American business: Harlow H. Curtice, Thomas J. Watson, Jr., Winthrop W. Aldrich, Benjamin Fairless, Paul G. Hoffman. Its advice has traditionally been given in secret, but this may be the only way to get candid—and possibly valuable—advice from such a group. It is the takers of the advice rather than the givers who are responsible to the country for their subsequent actions. From the testimony of BAC executive director Walter White in 1951, however, it is clear that the members are in a position to get "off-the-record" official information at their meetings, and unquestionably they are able to make warm and helpful contacts inside government.

The activities of the 39 WOCs presently operating full-time in Washington and the thousand or so part-time consultants from industry are not so nebulous. Adolph Wenzell was receiving his $15 a day as a consultant to the Budget Bureau—the normal fee for the WOCs—while still on the payroll of the First Boston Corporation. In his official capacity, he was advising the government to undertake a program — the Dixon-Yates project—which would substantially have benefited his own investment banking house. When Leonard E. Pasek of the Kimberly-Clark Paper and Pulp Corp. was assistant director of BDSA's Pulp and Paper Division, he supplied his company with official data; cleared the recommendations he made as a WOC with his superiors in private enterprise; and ruled on tax-amortization applications of competing companies. All during his tour of duty as a WOC he carried on his routine activities as Washington representative of Kimberly-Clark, which included making contact with members of Congress on company matters and promoting the company's interests with government agencies. Under the terms of the Defense Production Act, a WOC is only supposed to be hired if there is no equally competent government official to fill the post. But the vice-president of the Continental Can Co. described one WOC—a Continental Can executive—as a "messenger boy." He said he was not qualified to be anything else. And when Franz Von Schilling, a Caltex Oil Co. official, was removed from his Interior Department job, he was quickly replaced by a presumably competent career civil service employee.

Full-time paid Administration appointees from private industry have also been found in questionable positions. W. W. White, an Esso vice-president, hired by the Air Force to buy its gas and oil, is collecting the difference between his large private salary and his not-so-large government salary from Standard Oil. Another oilman, H. A. Stewart, is receiving a pension after 30 years with Texaco while he serves as oil and gas chief for the Department of the Interior.

Most unusual action by a commission chairman yet uncovered was FTC chairman Edward F. Howrey's interference in the government's prosecution of an antitrust suit against one of the firms he had represented before he took his official post.

In none of these cases have any of the conflict-of-interest laws been applied, although there has been much talk about applying them. The reason for this, in part, lies in the legal exemptions granted the WOCs under the Defense Production Act, as a way of enticing the businessmen to Washington. In part, it lies in the disinclination of the President to take such unpleasant legal action against one of his own appointees. And, in part, it is because the laws themselves are out of date. WALTER GOODMAN

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OIL AND POLITICS — II

Just So They Vote Right

by Robert Engler

THE VEXING question of money in politics, has become equated with oil money in politics, a viewpoint encouraged by the rising costs of campaigns, the declining standards of public and private morality, the broad loopholes in our tax laws and the enlarged egos of some Texas oilmen. A $5,000 contribution by H. L. Hunt in a particular state or $50,000 gifts from Roy H. Cullen checkerboarded across the nation win scare-headlines in the liberal and labor press. And deservedly so. But the recorded spending of better than $1 million for Averell Harriman's gubernatorial victory in New York passes without comment.



There is distortion, too, in singling out oilmen for their particular political preferences and exertions, rights which, as individuals, they are entitled to enjoy as freely as farmers, airline executives, teamsters, doctors and Wall Street brokers. This does not dismiss, however, the larger problem posed for a political democracy when the sheer economic power of a few gives them voice and representation far out of proportion to members. There are thousands of "oilmen," even if one does choke slightly over the industry's current propaganda about 42,000 "independent" oil companies. Their individual politics, in terms of purpose and party identification, do vary. While no sharp lines can be drawn, it is important to recognize some distinction between those in politics for the immediate ends of oil and those whose objectives entail the furthering of their particular image of the good society.

Oil people share certain common problems and philosophical approaches. In some phases of production big money can be made suddenly, with individual daring, shrewd bargaining, persistence and luck. The millionaire wildcatters such as Hunt, Cullen, Murchison, Richardson and a host of others are prototypes of businessmen in other segments of the economy from an earlier period of our history. Their simple image of the boundless opportunity in America for all who would reach out for it is reinforced by their own experiences and unchallenged by continuous direct dealings with unions, welfare problems and social responsibility. Interference with profits and regulation by government easily become equated with socialism. Some, like the immediate source of their wealth, are fairly crude in their approach to public affairs. A regional counsel for one large oil company summed up their pre-election political relations with aspiring office holders to a veteran Southwestern newsman: "You just put good, green folding money in their lily-white hands and be goddamn sure they know why you put it there."

But it is hard to make villains out of these oil producers and their staffs after talking with them in their offices and in the fields. They are generally friendly, rugged, intelligent and outspoken in their faith in a competitive society. And they are far more attractive than the modern college-trained corporation executive one increasingly encounters whose pleasant words sound pre-tested and whose vaunted initiative is repeatedly mocked when the long-distance calls come in from the regional office in Denver or the home office in Tulsa or New York.

It is now customary to identify oil with the Republican Party or the Dixiecrat movement. But during the New Deal, oilmen made many cash contributions to the

"The oil of Texas is upon you."

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Democratic Party. In 1936, for example, H. L. Dougherty of the Cities Service Company reported giving $55,000. Jacob Blaustein of the American Oil Company was consistently pro-New Deal. In fact the Democrats received sizeable oil money as late as 1944. Postponements of anti-trust suits and of tidelands litigation in the courts until after the 1944 election were not unrelated to such generosity.

But conservative Southern Democrats had found it increasingly difficult to accept the course of the party as it became more and more the party of immigrants, minorities, the Negro, labor, welfare, regulation and national power. With substantial support from oil, the anti-New Deal elements, which in 1948 were to burst out of the party via the Dixiecrats in a blaze of principle over states' rights, had been preparing a counter-movement since 1936. This was long before tidelands or civil rights were made headline issues. The anti-Roosevelt forces in the Texas Democratic convention in 1944 included attorneys from Sinclair, Socony-Vacuum, Humble (Standard of New Jersey), Sun and other oil companies. These "Texas Regulars" had further financial backing from Republicans including Cullen and other oilmen, who were joined with other big corporate interests for the common and continuing purpose of capturing the "Southern Democracy" and splitting the national Democratic Party in order to prevent another Roosevelt victory.

By 1947, the chairman of the Texas Democratic State Executive Committee could declare: "It may not be a wholesome thing to say, but the oil industry today is in complete control of state politics and state government." And in 1948 prominent oil lawyers who represented the majors as well as the independents had positions of leadership among the Dixiecrats in Alabama, Mississippi, Texas and Louisiana. It was the activities of some of these politicians, including Leander Perez of Louisiana, Senators Eastland and Holland, and Governors Shivers, Thurmond and Wright, which made the entire "tidelands" issue an uncompromisable one, long after the major oil interests and the Truman wing of the Democratic Party were ready for compromise federal controls which would have recognized existing state leases. Their behavior reinforced the image of this movement as primarily an attempt to smash the party and control the pieces. And it placed upon the shoulders of liberal Southerners like Lister Hill and John Sparkman who opposed the "giveaway" the formidable task of preserving the Democratic Party in the South.

The Democratic Party was so frightened of the issue that its 1948 platform was silent on "tidelands." The Republicans favored the "restoration to the states of their historic rights to the tide and submerged lands, tributary waters and streams."

Encouraged by their "tidelands" promises, many Dixiecrats openly moved into the Republican camp in 1948.

Oil money was no stranger to the Republican Party. Rockefeller's Standard Oil Company gave $250,000 for McKinley's 1896 campaign against Bryan, repeating this contribution in 1900.

Oil had backed Harding, in part with eyes on the naval reserve. Harry Sinclair helped pay the Republican Party deficit incurred in electing Harding, making the embarrassing error of using Liberty Bonds which were to feature in the Teapot Dome exposé. Pew (Sun Oil) and Rockefeller money have been given generously to the Republicans in numerous elections over the years, including 1954.

General Eisenhower was studied carefully by the power forces of the economy and quite early he received assurances of support from the nation's financial centers. Oil also welcomed his candidacy, as evidenced by the backing he received from the top officers of Standard of California, Cities Service, Gulf and Chase National Bank, to mention a few. The independent oil millionaires added their endorsements. Seth Richardson visited him in Paris in 1952 and reportedly pledged several million dollars if he would run. Eisenhower's letter to Jack Porter, favoring state ownership of the tidelands and coming just ten days before the Senate offshore oil vote, marked his entry into domestic politics and his bid for the convention support of the states' righters who leaned to Taft or to a third party.

In Louisiana, Texas and other Southern states major oil company executives and attorneys were prominent in the Republican crusade, and the new middle-class professionals and technicians employed by oil were also active. Older independent oilmen tended to join in support of Eisenhower while backing the non-Fair Deal Democratic tickets. The Amarillo airport during the Texas Democratic convention has been described by one Senatorial observer as "choked with oil company planes" which had flown delegates to the convention from all over the state. Murchison originally had spent a large sum seeking to build a Democratic Party groundswell for Eisenhower; when this failed, he worked for the Republican victory. Adlai Stevenson's forthright stand on federal control of offshore oil lands reinforced the alienation of Texas Governor Allan Shivers and his allies in the South while further assuring oilmen of the wisdom of their choice.

STILL, not even Eisenhower's smashing personal victory and his quickly displayed gratitude to the oil industry have completely resolved the dilemma of the coalescing oil elements of the Republican Party. The various oil interests could all roughly agree on taxes, natural resources and the menace of regulation and creeping socialism. But many of the independent oilmen, especially the producers of the Southwest, are essentially isolationist. When the United States joined the United Nations in 1945, Cullen announced that the country was "decaying politically—so fast that it is very doubtful that we can continue as a democracy much longer, unless

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we retrace our steps. . . ." The Bricker Amendment was a reflection of such fears, and President Eisenhower himself is reported to have charged that the movement is financed by two of the Texas oilmen, presumably Hunt and Cullen.

Caught by reduced production allowances and increased imports as well as consumer shifts to new fuels, the smaller producers without overseas holdings fear the reciprocal trade policies defended by the major oil companies. They are now in the midst of a major Congressional drive for import quotas on oil, having the backing of thousands of citizens in oil states who identify their own economic well being as dependent upon that of these producers. They also have the sympathy of many political leaders. "Failure of oil imports to adjust to demand conditions . . . must be taken as evidence that the problem cannot be solved without some form of national policy implemented by Congressional action," Governor Shivers testified recently, the ardency of his states' rights passion strangely temporarily subdued.

Some of the wealthy independent oilmen are disappointed in President Eisenhower's "acceptance" of the Fair Deal and One World. It is significant that the hundreds of thousands of dollars that they have spread throughout the nation in recent elections, including 1954, have generally gone to support essentially anti-Eisenhower Republicans. The roster includes Senators Jenner, Dirksen, Cain, Welker, Goldwater, Malone, Ecton and McCarthy. Cullen alone *reported* $53,000 spent in 1952 for a number of candidates including Martin Dies, Price Daniel and Joseph McCarthy. A survey of the newspaper *Labor* indicated his family *reported* more than $40,000 spent in 1954. It also related that major oil company officials and stockholders contributed heavily in 1954 to the various Republican committees and candidates. Some of the money turned up in the closing days of heated campaigns in the Western states and was used to finance unusually vicious red smears against O'Mahoney in Wyoming, Murray in Montana and Carroll in Colorado.

No claim is being advanced that all oil producers behave this way. There are also those like Texan J. R. Parten who have been bluntly anti-McCarthy and have backed Yarborough against Shivers and Stevenson against Eisenhower. Then too, "outside oil money pouring into the state" can also serve as a useful bogey or rallying cry in the North or Northwest for the backers of candidates in need of popular support.

The leaders of the major companies, unlike the isolationist independents, are international-trade minded, having substantial overseas reserves and investments and being seriously concerned with problems of distribution and marketing: Sophisticated enough to know you can't repeal the first half of the twentieth century, even if you do control billion dollar empires, they avoid open attacks on the labor movement and welfare legislation. In Louisiana, for example, friends of organized labor have implied

"Mr. President, I rise to a pint of oil."

that the big oil companies were helping finance the recently passed "right to work" bill movement. A major company's lawyer denied this. "We thought it was an excellent bill, but we were reluctant to take a stand openly. We would lose friends; it was too hot an issue."

The major oil executives have a long view of politics as one of the instruments of business. They prefer to maintain good relations with all parties. Some companies even are reported as making a practice of having vice presidents from both political faiths who then can serve as contact men with their parties. But they much prefer the image of themselves as responsible business statesmen who are prepared to operate within the governmental framework where necessary.

There is, of course, a very potent "oil lobby," despite denials by the industry.

It is true that advocates of federal control too were reluctant to spell out the nature of the oil lobby and to tell who had the heavy investments in offshore oil—let alone mention the entrenchment of oil within Interior. Such caution seemed understandable if not attractive to a civil servant who has dealt with oil for many years: "Oil goes after individuals down here. Be general, say 'oil lobby'. That's okay. But let a politician or bureaucrat be specific, name names and they'll gun for him."

But the tidelands fight provided an excellent case study of the great pressure ability of the industry in Washington. Deployed in full force were the various echelons of respectable law firms, ex-government personnel, public relations consultants, trade association representatives,

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company vice-presidents-in-charge-of-governmental-relations, company legal counsel and public relations executives, and even men of lesser social status who called themselves lobbyists.

Lawyers are an integral part of the oil scene. Some, like the late Peter Q. Nyce, devote part of their time to watching Interior Department leases on the public domain for the oil companies whom they serve. There are some 100,000 oil and gas leases involving more than 71 million acres of federal lands. Nyce, an authority on federal leasing, represented a great many oil companies on a fee basis. An active lobbyist, he enjoyed an unusually intimate relationship with the Senate Interior Committee and even wrote one of their reports. He further served as a contact man in raising campaign money for deserving legislators who sought his help. "I made oil companies ante up for various candidates."

CLARK Clifford, a former Truman naval aide and legal counsel, earns a handsome retainer representing Standard of California in its dealings with the Navy on their joint holdings in the Elk Hills oil reserve in California. Phillips Oil is also one of his clients. According to a *Fortune* article on lawyers and lobbying, prepared while the Democrats were still in office, Clifford made clear that "I have not and will not register as a lobbyist, for that is not the kind of work we do. We run a law office here, with a background of experience in the general practice of law topped off by an intimate knowledge of how the government operates."

Clifford, who takes pride in his role in drafting Mr. Truman's fine "tidelands" veto message, told the writer of this series he had never seen any sign of oil influence in the Democratic Party during his White House tenure and that he did not think oil was a significant force in American politics. Our interview was terminated when Mr. Clifford departed for a visit with then Secretary of the Navy Robert B. Anderson about the naval reserves. Mr. Anderson, later Deputy Secretary of Defense, was at one time president of the Mid-Continent Oil and Gas Association and had been sought for the presidency of the American Petroleum Institute. This is not mentioned to suggest impropriety in office. But it illustrates how engulfing are the affairs of oil. The number of public figures with oil backgrounds or relations is overwhelming and in compiling such a list one could lead off with Secretary of State Dulles, whose law firm of Sullivan and Cromwell represents the Standard Oil Company (New Jersey). And so does Covington and Burling, the law firm of former Secretary of State Dean Acheson.

Although the cocktail party, buttonholing, making the rounds and testifying are still part of the game, old-fashioned lobbying is generally passé. But there is always oil's ability to offer private air transportation for public officials dedicating pipelines or just visiting home.

And oil's social lobby is effective. The problem here is not primarily that of conspiracy or design. Rather is it in the nature of oil's vast interests and of the social patterns of our culture which provide so many informal channels for interchange among people of power throughout the nation.

Oil lobbying is a fine art, if not a science. As high an authority as the executive director of the NAM's Washington office, in a pamphlet *Know Your Congressman* published in 1944 for the guidance of businessmen, had this to say about oil's (presumably the API) role in handling the industry's appearances before the Temporary National Economic Committee in 1939:

> For weeks the petroleum group studied the TNEC members and watched their conduct [*sic*] of witnesses. When the oil men appeared, they knew the likes and dislikes of each committee member, and they pulled out an organ stop that appealed to everyone on the committee. Even the committee members were high in their praise of what the oil industry had done. And most important of all, it ended the clamor to enact legislation drastically regulating the oil industry.

Lobbying also takes place in the States. (In early oil days, one observer commented that "the Standard Oil Company has done everything with the Pennsylvania legislature except to refine it.") Taxes, leases and regulations are generally the areas of concern. In Montana, for example, one of the few states which has managed to hold on to its federal land grants, the oil interests have been trying for many years to get leases on school lands which would continue as long as oil and gas could be produced, instead of those limited to a definite number of years. They have descended on Helena, hiring an ex-governor and an ex-Supreme Court justice as well as leading law firms; they have also brought pressure in Washington to revise the state's enabling act.

On a more systematic basis, the American Petroleum Industries Committee, a part of the API, operates in virtually every state capital. Taxes on gasoline are its avowed focal point, with the parent committee serving as a clearing house for research and education on tax and regulatory issues. In Colorado, for example, the Petroleum Industries Committee has as its registered lobbyist an ex-legislator and Republican floor leader. "I keep close watch on the legislature on oil matters. I make it my business to visit at home each elected state legislator —or perhaps even before he is elected—to get to know him. I want to do this before he comes to Denver where my face is just one of a hundred new ones he'll have to know. If I can get him on a first name calling basis that means a lot. When he comes up to Denver, he'll be lonely, but he'll see a friendly face. I'll help him around, find out what committee he wants, explain about them, and help him get set on the committee if I possibly can." In North Dakota the Committee lobbyist explained: "We are not in politics. But of course we tell members who are their friends and who are not."

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

How "Depletion" Works

If a factory building costs $100,000 and is expected to last 50 years, the factory owner is allowed to deduct $2,000 from his income tax each year for 50 years for depreciation. (After 50 years he has deducted the entire $100,000 investment.) But for oil well owners there is a special tax law. Every year they can deduct 27.5 percent — of *gross income*, not capital invested. If a well which cost $1 million produces $5 million of oil for ten years, the owner can deduct $13,750,000 from income taxes, or almost 14 times what he invested.

The many state and regional oil trade associations like the Rocky Mountain Oil and Gas Association and the Mid-Continent Oil and Gas Association are active in their state capitals and in state politics; many maintain Washington offices. The American Petroleum Institute, in turn, with main offices in New York, is the meeting ground for all such groups in the industry. In the past the API has been the object of federal anti-trust suits and was nearly banned in Texas. Today it encourages a public image of itself as scholarly and research minded. The Institute prides itself on keeping out of controversy and publicly acts not unlike an embassy, representing the government of oil to the US government.

Some observers argue, and with good evidence, that the real oil lobby is right in the Congress. Certainly it is difficult to find a Congressman from an oil or gas state who will ever vote "wrong" on oil or gas legislation. Many frankly refer to themselves as oil Congressmen, in the same sense that others call themselves farm bloc Congressmen. They know what their attitudes on such matters as depletion ought to be. "We oil Congressmen represent our people," explained Rep. Tom Steed of Oklahoma. "It is my duty to represent their views. I would be replaced otherwise and would deserve to be."

There was a time when Speaker of the House Sam Rayburn, whose district is not in the center of oil country, had bucked oil. But as his parliamentary tactics on depletion allowances and the Kerr natural gas bill showed, he is now sympathetic to the industry's expressed needs. The cover of the *Tipro Reporter* (Texas Independent Petroleum and Royalty Owners Association) for October, 1954, featured Senators Price Daniel and Lyndon Johnson as "the Senators from and for Texas." Both were hailed as true friends of the oil industry. Sen. Johnson was singled out for his role in the Kerr gas bill and the depletion allowance battles. "Texas independents will be ever grateful for your effective leadership in preserving the depletion allowance," wired *Tipro* to Johnson, who replied: "I am here trying to fight the organization's battles every day."

Johnson evidently is aware of the price he pays for this loyalty. And like Senator Robert Kerr (Democrat, Oklahoma and president of Kerr-McGee Oil Industries) he is somewhat bitter that this identification should be held against him in his ambitions for the Presidency. A courageous fighter on certain issues, Kerr refused to vote on "tidelands" so as to avoid the charge that he was an interested party. His company was one of the largest leaseholders in the Gulf. But his activities against natural gas regulation are well known and "millionaire oilman" and "the Kerr natural gas bill' are tags not easily discarded.

Johnson's problem is not that of personal holdings. "When I'm investigating military waste . . . I'm a true liberal, a friend of the people," he declared several years ago in a *Fortune* interview. "But when I take a position in line with the biggest industry in my state—when I take the position the people of my state want me to take—I'm through in the columns. I'm a reactionary, I'm a scoundrel who has sold out to the interests. . . . Don't think it's not a serious matter for me. I've lost the best chance, maybe the only chance, I have to build up a good national reputation and be something more than a Senator."

To some legislators the moral issue is of a different nature. One veteran Texas representative was musing about the whole problem with this writer. We were discussing depletion.

> Depletion is a steal, it is robbery. I wonder why the rest of the country stands for it. But nine of eleven of my districts are oil districts, so what can I do. It bothers me. Someday I may vote against it. I've been thinking about it. But of course, if the rest of the country doesn't howl, why should we? But it's outrageous robbery, depleting over and over and over 100 percent. What will happen to me? Well, the oil companies don't trust me anyways, although I've never done anything against them.

As last year's Senate debate over depletion showed, oil's influence extends far beyond the producing states and the Democratic Party. Senator Williams (R, Del.) had boldly proposed a reduction to 15 percent and Douglas (D, Ill.) offered an amendment providing for a graduated tax which would help the genuine small producers rather than the millionaires. They could not get the nineteen votes necessary to order a roll call vote. Matthew Neely (D, W. Va.), a defender of depletion, warned his colleague from Illinois that he was inviting his own defeat on November 2. (More than a third of the counties of Illinois have oil or gas production, with the 1953 output valued at $182 million.) Douglas persisted. ". . . I again ask for the yeas and nays. Every man has a right to commit suicide." Only a handful were ready to risk exercising this right by standing up to be counted in an election year.

The yeas and nays were not ordered.

(A third article in this series will appear next week.)

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

The Superficial Aspect

Self-Punishment by Secrecy

In the nursery it used to be considered evidence of a certain lack of mentality in Simple Simon that he

> went a-fishing
> For to catch a whale,
> But all the water he had got
> Was in his mother's pail.

But the recent scientific congress in Geneva suggests that we may have been doing Simple Simon an injustice. Perhaps he was not idiotic by nature. Perhaps he was simply overawed by the military mind.

For it is the consensus of scientists departing from Geneva that the most remarkable feature of the meeting was its relevation that in the matter of developing atomic energy for peaceful uses all the nations reporting are at approximately the same stage. It was agreed that the United States presented some really novel ideas relative to the construction of large reactors, and that the Russians presented some new things relative to small ones. But for the rest everybody had achieved pretty much the same successes and suffered pretty much the same failures; although nobody knew it until this meeting revealed the fact.

So it appears that the successful work along this line has been done four or five times, when once was enough. Solving even the simpler problems presented by atomic energy is admittedly severe intellectual labor—so severe that only a handful of men in any country have both the innate capacity and the rigorous training necessary for success. Yet it now appears that it has happened again and again that some of the finest brains in the United States, Great Britain and Russia have been kept wrestling for months and perhaps years with a problem that one or the other of them had solved long ago.

The reason for this ridiculous situation is that the scientist in each nation had available only the knowledge discovered in his own country. The policy of secrecy prevented him from knowing what other scientists were doing and, even more important, what they had done. He was going after the biggest whale in the history of physics, but he was permitted to fish only in Mother's pail, not in the ocean of human achievement.

It is greatly to the credit of the scientists that anything has been accomplished under such a handicap; but it is equally to the discredit of the policy of secrecy that we are not years closer to complete success than we are. A large number of exceedingly difficult problems remain to be solved before we can tap this source of power efficiently. If Amerian scientists had known that the problem they were currently engaged on had been solved by others, they would have dropped it and gone to work on something that remains unsolved.

But it couldn't be done because the military mind feared that a potential enemy might learn something of military advantage by the policy of exchanging information. Fear is, of course, the logical and correct bent of the military mind; its function is to fear the worst and prepare against it. The bent of the scientific mind is the opposite; it is to hope for the best and prepare for it. The world's greatest error was in permitting the military mind to dominate the scientific field. The net result is that our potential enemies have learned anyhow all that we might have given them; but none of us has learned as much as we might have learned about using atomic energy for good instead of evil purposes.

Chairman Lewis Strauss of the Atomic Energy Commission announces that the lesson of Geneva is that the United States still leads. Maybe. But the Atomic Energy Commission also told us—and told President Eisenhower, to his subsequent embarrassment—that it had revealed all the facts about the Dixon-Yates contract, when it had kept some of the most significant concealed; so Mr. Strauss need not expect the public to take his unsupported word for anything. In any event, there are those who consider it less important that America leads, if it does, than that the whole world lags, which is a certainty.

"Scared out of seven years' growth" used to be regarded as merely a figure of speech and an extravagant one; but as regards the development of atomic energy for peaceful purposes it seems to be a plain statement of fact. When one considers how much of the burden of dull, routine labor atomic power might lift from the backs of mankind any delay in its attainment takes on the aspect of bitter tragedy. But it also contains the elements of broad farce. Crawling under the bed is rarely an intelligent course of action even when danger is clear and present, much less so when it is merely potential. To many persons the most offensive ingredient of McCarthyism was less the danger that it might make Americans slaves than the fact that it was making us comic figures in the eyes of the civilized world. The outcome of the Geneva conference underscores the doleful truth that while our peril may be real, our way of meeting it is sometimes idiotic.

GERALD W. JOHNSON

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BOOKS & COMMENT

Hawthorne—Pastoral and Politics

by Irving Howe

No portrait of Hawthorne, wrote Henry James, "is at all exact which fails to insist upon the constant struggle which must have gone on between his shyness and his desire to know something of life; between what may be called his evasive and inquisitive tendencies." This remark provides a clue not merely to Hawthorne but to a good many other American writers, including James himself, for it focuses on the dualities of moral attitude and literary

RE-ASSESSMENT: 1955

approach that cut through so much of our writing. In the work of Hawthorne they are particularly severe: his outer conventionality as against his suppressed recalcitrance, the frequent Augustan deadness of his prose as against its occasional release into pure lucidity, the mild and almost somnolent surface of his mind as against the vital lawlessness beneath. Nowhere are these more pronounced than in *The Blithedale Romance.*

Throughout his life Hawthorne was caught up in what we would now call a crisis of belief. Estranged from the dominant thought of his time, Hawthorne could summon no large enthusiasms nor pledge himself to any social movement; his prevalent temper was skeptical, though a powerful impulse within him worked to assault and deride his skepticism.

This crisis of belief was curiously "modern," however, in that he was drawn far less to belief itself than to the enlargements of feeling that might come with it, the passions it might release and regulate. In its assumptions this view of things might almost be called "pragmatist," odd as that word seems in relation to Hawthorne.

As a nineteenth century American he could not acquiesce in Puritan dogma; as a man who had neither the enthusiasm nor the fatuousness of Transcendental romanticism he could not break free from the Puritan mode of vision. He did not see what the Puritans had seen, he saw as they had seen. He felt that no matter how questionable the notion of "original sin" might be as doctrine or how distasteful if allowed to become the substance of a practical morality, it nonetheless touched upon a fundamental truth concerning human beings. This truth, however, he reduced from a dogma to an insight, defending it on empirical grounds rather than as revelation.

Similar problems of belief troubled him, though far less acutely, in politics. A democrat by hesitation rather than conviction, he disliked reformers, distrusted the Abolitionists, and adhered to that wing of the Democratic Party, a mediocre small-souled wing, which hoped to patch up a truce of expediency with the slave-owning South. In an age blazing with certainty, he had to make his way in doubt. The breakdown of faith in God, human capacity and social progress that would later shake the world, was foreshadowed in his life. He seldom made these opinions explicit, but they form the buried foundations of his visible work.

Yet one cannot read his novels without seeing that in addition to the skeptic there is a man so eager for experiment that at times the "inquisitive tendency" becomes sheer hunger. Thus Hawthorne finds himself drawn, against his will and sometimes without his conscious knowledge, to moral outlaws who dare what he himself never even desired to dare. This Hawthorne yearns for some great liberating transformation which will bring him, for the first time, into full life. His mind was sluggish, mild, rationalistic; his creative self was passionate, warmly receptive, sometimes even sensual. It would be oversimplifying to see these two strands as always in opposition, for that would have made his life intolerable; but the two strands were there.

The quiet of Hawthorne's life was interrupted by a few adventures, a few raids on experience, of which the most interesting was perhaps his brief participation in Brook Farm, the famous utopian community of the 1840's. Most of Hawthorne's biographers, refusing to reach beneath the surface of his reminiscence, have assumed that since he did not agree with the ideas of the reformers he entered Brook Farm simply to find a way of supporting his future wife. But that hardly seems a sufficient reason, for it is unlikely that so hard-headed a man as Hawthorne would have thought Brook Farm a good financial investment. More plausible, though admittedly speculative, is the assumption that Hawthorne, apart from motives of convenience and perhaps without fully realizing it himself, was seeking in Brook Farm another kind of investment, an investment in shared life. What may have tempted him was not the ideas of the reformers, but their implicit faith in the possibility of human communication.

And despite its antipathy to the reformers, despite its tone of aggressive mockery, *The Blithedale Romance* makes it abundantly clear that Brook Farm had struck deeply into Hawthorne's consciousness. In his own secretive way he had come up against many of the problems that would form a dominant subject of the twentieth century novel: the relation between ideology and utopia, the meeting between politics and sex.

The dualism that controls almost everything in *The Blithedale Romance* is that between subject and object, narrator and event. At the several points where the novel breaks down, the trouble is not merely one of literary structure, it also involves a radical uncertainty as to the possibilities of knowledge. Everything is seen through the eyes of Coverdale, a timid "minor poet" recalling his stay at Blithedale, the utopian community modelled after Brook Farm; and so methodical is the evasiveness and mystification with which he presents the action that one begins to suspect the book is hampered less by literary clumsiness than by some psychological block of which he is merely the symptom.

Coverdale is clearly a self-portrait of Hawthorne, but a highly distorted and mocking self-portrait, as if he were trying to isolate and thereby exorcise everything within him that impedes full par-

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ticipation in life. The tendency to withdrawal that is so noticeable in Coverdale represents not merely a New Englander's fear of involvement in the dangers of society; it is also a moony narcissism by means of which an habitual observer, unable to validate his sense of the external world, tries magically to deny its reality. This symbolic annihilation of whatever resists control of the will reaches its climax when Hawthorne destroys, physically and psychologically, the two main characters who threaten Coverdale, though nothing in the logic of the plot requires so violent or extreme a conclusion.

As against the ineffectual Coverdale —who, by the way, lacks neither intelligence nor shrewdness—Hawthorne sets up several centers of anxiety. Blithedale itself, a place of idealism and effort; Zenobia, a sexually magnificent and intellectually daring woman who is a central figure in the community; Hollingsworth, a reformer who has come to Blithedale to "bore from within" in behalf of a monomaniacal scheme for salvaging convicts; and finally Priscilla, a sweet priss of a girl who represents the feminine principle in its most conservative aspect (that which makes the family go round)—all these challenge Coverdale, for all tempt him to break out of the circle of selfhood. His problem then becomes, how can he drain off some of their energy and power without taking the risks of commitment? Emotional parasitism is an obvious course, but with obvious limitations; in the end Hawthorne simply "rescues" Coverdale by suppressing the conflicts that threaten to liberate him—and thereby, it might be added, destroying the book.

COVERDALE'S relation to the utopian community is one of the first but still among the best treatments in the American novel of what happens when a hesitant intellectual attaches himself to a political enterprise. Looking back from his withered bachelorhood Coverdale is proud that at least once in his life he dared to plunge: "Whatever else I repent of, let it be reckoned neither among my sins nor my follies that I once had force and faith enough to form generous hopes of the world's destiny. . . ." And throughout the book Hawthorne retains a qualified affection for that side of New England utopianism which would later prompt Parrington to speak of Brook Farm as "a social poem fashioned out of Yankee homespun."

When Coverdale finally leaves Blithedale, he does so from a feeling—it will reappear in many American novels—that he is inadequate to public life, incapable of the monolithic enthusiasms a utopian politics demands. ("The greatest obstacle to being heroic," he shrewdly notes, "is the doubt whether one may not be going to prove one's self a fool.") Partly, too, he "sees through" the utopian impulse, discovering what would hardly surprise a more realistic and experienced man: that behind its ideal claims it often shelters personal inadequacy and ideological fanaticism. And finally he grows weary of that constant depreciation of the present in the name of an ideal future which seems so necessary to utopian radicalism: "I was beginning to lose the sense of what kind of world it was, among innumerable schemes of what it might or ought to be."

Yet all of this, though pointed enough, is not very far from the usual criticism of utopian politics or, for that matter, from the usual attack upon the nineteenth century idea of progress; and what really distinguishes *The Blithedale Romance* is another kind of criticism, double-edged, subtle and generally unnoticed.

Hawthorne saw that, motives apart, the formation of isolated utopian communities was seldom a threat to society; he understood that no matter how pure its inner moral aspirations might be, the utopian community could not avoid functioning as part of the materialistic world it detested.

> I very soon became sensible [says Coverdale] that, as regarded society at large, we stood in a position of new hostility, rather than new brotherhood. . . . Constituting so pitiful a minority as now, we were inevitably estranged from the rest of mankind in pretty fair proportion with the strictness of our mutual bond among ourselves.

And at another point:

> The peril of our new way of life was not lest we should fail to become practical agriculturists, but that we should probably cease to be anything else.

The utopian who would cut himself off from the ugly world must, to preserve his utopia, becomes a "practical agriculturist"—which means to model his utopia upon the society he rejects. Hawthorne's sister-in-law Elizabeth Peabody wrote in the 1840's that Brook Farm proved little beyond the fact that "gentlemen, if they will work as many hours as boors, will succeed even better in cultivating a farm." And Emerson, who understood very well the precarious relation between intellectuals and society, wrote in his journal that he refused to join Brook Farm because to do so would be "to hide my impotency in the thick of a crowd."

If Hawthorne criticizes the utopian impulse on the ground that it does not really succeed in avoiding the evil of the great world, he also implies that another trouble with utopianism is that it does not bring its followers into a sufficiently close relation with the evil of the great world. And in the context of the novel these two ideas are not as incompatible as they might seem.

FOR the whole utopian venture at Blithedale, with its effort to sublimate the impulse of political idealism into a pastoral retreat, bears a thoroughly innocent air. It is an innocence peculiar to many nineteenth century American intellectuals, who believed that politics, when it was not simply a vulgarity to be avoided, could be engaged in through a series of moral precepts. This innocence—or perhaps one should speak of a willed search for innocence—was of course related to the hopelessly crude and corrupt nature of our "ordinary" national politics, and it showed itself in no more endearing form than its assumption that "ordinary" politics could be got away from, or supplanted by, the politics of pastoral. America itself having in some sense gone astray, utopianism would remake it in the small.

The characters in *The Blithedale Romance,* even those who represent worldliness, also partake of this New England innocence. For even as Zenobia and Hollingsworth, the one a radical in behavior and the other a radical in ideology, are seen as figures of enviable passion and experience, there is a tacit recognition that it is only by Coverdale's standards that they seem so rich in passion and experience. Hollingsworth, writes Hawthorne, "ought to have commenced his investigation of [the reform of criminals] by perpetrating some huge sin in his proper person, and examining the conditions of his conscience afterwards." It is as if Hawthorne, soon to

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punish Zenobia and Hollingsworth for their putative boldness, can accept his desire to punish them only through a half-suppressed feeling that they are not, in reality, bold enough.

ZENOBIA rules the book. "Passionate, luxurious, lacking simplicity, not deeply refined," she is the frankest embodiment of sensuality in Hawthorne's work. Except for Hollingsworth, whose appetite runs to political notions rather than human flesh, everyone in the book is drawn to her. For she alone is really alive, she alone is open in her sexuality. As if to cover up the freedom of his characterization, Hawthorne also endows her with a somewhat operatic manner, but this does not seriously detract from Zenobia's power and when one remembers how difficult and damaging the role of feminine reformer must have been in nineteenth century New England it even has a certain appropriateness. Throughout the book Zenobia is celebrated in rhapsodic outbursts:

> Zenobia had a rich, though varying color. It was, most of the while, a flame, and anon a sudden paleness. Her eyes glowed. . . . Her gestures were free, and strikingly impressive. The whole woman was alive with a passionate intensity, which I now perceived to be the phase in which her beauty culminated. Any passion would have become her well; and passionate love, perhaps, the best of all.

In her opulent, inaccessible sexuality Zenobia becomes a kind of New England earth goddess — though, given Hawthorne's estimate of New England women, a very intellectual goddess too. Both ways, she is the name of his desire.

Hawthorne quickly penetrates to the source and nature of Zenobia's sexuality; he relates it, both in its power and its limitations, to her political boldness. He understands that in her person is realized the threat to traditional modes of life which the others merely talk about. And he sees how, in turn, her political boldness contributes to and sanctions her personal freedom:

> She made no scruple of over-setting all human institutions, and scattering them as with a breeze from her fan. A female reformer, in her attacks upon society, has an instinctive sense of where the life lies, and is inclined to aim directly at that spot. Especially the relation between the sexes is naturally among the earliest to attract her attention.

This powerful insight Hawthorne put to two uses, making Zenobia into a vibrant woman who challenges established social norms but also showing how this very challenge twists and depletes her life. For as Zenobia ruefully admits, "The whole universe, her own sex and yours, and Providence, and Destiny, to boot, make common cause against the woman who swerves one hair's-breadth out of the beaten track."

But in addition to personal freedom, the intellectual and political audacity of Zenobia also brings with it the danger of a confusion of sexual roles. Zenobia's unconventionality as a woman allows her a certain masculine energy and arrogance, and while this provides her considerable public satisfaction it also prevents her from winning Hollingsworth's love, for he is one of those reformers who prefers that his wife be tame and submissive. In a brilliant little passage Hawthorne hints at the tragi-comic difficulties in Zenobia's position. Asked at the beginning of the book whether she knows Hollingsworth, Zenobia replies, "No, only as an auditor—auditress, I mean— of some of his lectures."

Can Zenobia, however, be both the personification of forbidden sexuality and a woman capable of so revealing a slip as the one I have just quoted? Is Hawthorne "cheating" when he portrays Zenobia as richly feminine yet particularly open to the dangers of subverting the feminine role?

Whatever the difficulty may be with Zenobia, it is not in Hawthorne's initial conception of her, which is marvellously deep and subtle; in fact, it is one of his major intuitive strokes that he notices how the political atmosphere which encourages a freer sexuality also endangers the feminine role. The trouble lies in Hawthorne's presentation, his unwillingness or incapacity to live up to the promise of his opening pages. For, like everything else in the book, Zenobia comes through only in flickers. Either because he draws back from his subject, fearful of his own boldness, or because he could not work up an action by which to sustain his subject, Hawthorne does not show us Zenobia in the motions and gestures of life. And that, of course, is one reason he can imply that she is not so thoroughly a figure of passion and experience as Coverdale supposes. The more she is to be shown as a temptress, the more must her temptations be called into question.

What is true for Zenobia as a projection of desire is truer still for Hollingsworth as a warning against the dangers of ideology. A number of recent critics have praised Hawthorne's presentation of Hollingsworth as a prophetic anticipation of the reformer who is cold to everything but his own scheme. Were Hollingsworth "there," were he endowed with a certain contingency and thickness and color of presentation, this point might well be true. For it is clearly Hawthorne's intention to show in Hollingsworth the utopian impulse as it has hardened into an inhumane ideology. But in the novel as Hawthorne wrote it, Hollingsworth is a dismal failure. He never *does* anything, he seldom displays any emotional fluidity or complexity, he is rarely given one of those saving human touches which, by their very presence, would make more credible his essential inhumanity.

There are, of course, a few passages in which Hawthorne breathes a little life into him—as when Hollingsworth, with that single-minded sincerity which is a form of blindness, asks Coverdale, "How can you be my life-long friend, except you strive with me toward the great object of my life?" or when Zenobia bursts out that Hollingsworth's political dedication "is all self! . . . Nothing else; nothing but self, self, self!"

Such passages, however, do little but suggest how great was Hawthorne's opportunity and how thoroughly he missed it, for Hollingsworth conforms so conveniently to Hawthorne's skepticism concerning reformers that he cannot have much reality of his own.

ANY critic who cares enough to write about *The Blithedale Romance* runs the risk of suggesting that it is a better book than it actually is, for its topics are so close to our current preoccupations that they need merely be named in order to set off appropriate responses. And with a novel so abundant in potentiality and so limited in realization there is the further danger of writing about the book it might have been rather than the one it is. For by any serious reckoning *The Blithedale Romance* must be called a remarkable

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failure of a very remarkable writer.

In an excellent essay on Hawthorne, Philip Rahv has written that "the emotional economy" of *The Blithedale Romance* "is throughout one of displacement . . . the only genuine relationship is that of Coverdale to Zenobia, the rest is mystification. But the whole point of Coverdale's behavior is to avoid involvement." The remark is keen, and I would qualify it only by adding that there seems one other relationship which for Coverdale has elements of risk and involvement, his aborted discipleship to Hollingsworth. He draws back from Zenobia's personal freedom, he draws back from Hollingsworth's political commitment, and in both cases he finds reasons, often good enough in their own right, with which to rationalize his timidity. Zenobia and Hollingsworth together stand for "the world," the dangerous beckoning world of experience and liberation. To cheat Coverdale of these temptations, which to one or another extent means to cheat himself, Hawthorne must end the novel by drowning Zenobia and breaking Hollingsworth's spirit.

And yet . . . one feels drawn to the book, to its hidden reserves, its sudden sparks of perception, its deep underground passions. Henry James saw enough possibilities in its theme to base one of his greatest novels upon it: *The Bostonians,* in many ways, is what Hawthorne's book could have been. But even James did not exhaust its possibilities, and if ever someone does write a great novel about political life in twentieth century America he will find a storehouse of cryptic leads and untapped resources in Hawthorne's great failure *The Blithedale Romance.*

The Girl Who Went Back Home

by Nora Magid

THE MORAL is: if one's destiny is suburbia, there is no point in seeking to "be an actress" rather than "a fat dull housewife with a big engagement ring." The moral is also that a man who has written an interesting book from a masculine point of view (*The Caine Mutiny*) shouldn't push his luck too far by trying to reverse the procedure. At one point in her life, Marjorie Morgenstern finds that she is "very bored with the problems of being a girl." Herman Wouk's problem is plainly that he has never been one, and he cannot quite manage to tell a girl's story from a girl's point of view. *Marjorie Morningstar* is soap opera with psychological and sociological props.

Marjorie Morningstar, by Herman Wouk (Doubleday; $4.95).

Its heroine starts out as a lovely seventeen-year-old, who, having made the transition from the Bronx to Central Park West, is reluctant to take the next step. She refuses to be "the respectable girl, the mother of the next generation, all tricked out to appear gay and girlish and carefree, but with a terrible threatening solid dullness jutting through, like the gray rocks under the spring grass in Central Park." She yearns instead to flower from Morgenstern to Morningstar ". . . her drab name turned into an incantation, a name that could blaze and thunder on Broadway." Eventually, she marries well, the vision fades; but there's a long, long trail (565 pages) awinding into the land of her dreams; and while every step she takes in the direction of Broadway only puts her more surely on the road to Mamaroneck, there are significant detours.

The first is to an adult camp her mother labels Sodom where she meets Noel and Life. Her best friend briefs her: "Really, your folks have given you a terrible upbringing. You seem to live in some pink-and-white dreamworld, where all the men are Galahads and all the girls are lily maids of Astolat, except they eat kosher food. Margie, you're an infant." Momentarily adrift, she has to become an unsucccessful actress and an unwilling mistress before she can become Shirley, the prototype of all she has been raised to want.

The story is told in the third person. Mr. Wouk tries to see it all obliquely from her perspective, and the effort proves too much. Marjorie is disconcertingly girlish ("It was a *terrific* release to kiss Noel"). Mr. Wouk also thinks that girls in their teens wear rouge before they wear lipstick, walk arm-in-arm, call one another dear and darling and baby, punctuate their sentences with gee and gosh and gad, think exclusively in hyperbole.

The men are as unbelievable as the ladies. Noel, the Greek God, who is dedicated to dissolution is nothing if not articulate; he regularly announces his own motivation—his crippled arm, his Oedipus complex, his early seduction by an older woman, his anger at and attraction to what constitutes being Jewish. Set up in opposition to him is Mike Eden, the other man, whose grandfather has technically freed him by changing the family name of Einstein, but Mike carries his burden of guilt and he atones by smuggling Jews out of Germany—the only political note in a book notable for omission since it takes place in the '30's.

The general problem is that where Marjorie wants Noel for a husband, he wants her for a mistress. He relinquishes her.

By the time he is ready to marry her, it is too late. Mike Eden has freed her for the triumph of conventional destiny —a successful prosperous professional man, who can give her a white house in the suburbs. The husband takes her despite the fact that they both recognize her to be a cripple, morally. She knows that she will never again see

> on his face the pure happiness that had shone there during the drive across the George Washington Bridge in the sunset. He loved her. He took her as she was, with her deformity . . . that could no longer be helped; a permanent crippling, like a crooked arm.

The environment Wouk creates is vivid and enormously complex. It touches on economic mobility — the moves from the Bronx to the Upper West Side to the suburbs, the compromises at Hunter between the Jewish and the Christian sororitites for political control, and the relationship of City College to Ivy League students; the conflicts between the older, immigrant generation —sweet, squashed, and loving—and the younger, growing up in a world that includes Freud and pork and the Unitarian Church; the flight from and to Jewishness.

The fascinating cultural scene is, however, backdrop to the banal love story.

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A COMMUNICATION

► French Taste in American Writing

SOME erroneous attitudes are so persistent and recurrent that often the less said about them, the less the confusion increases. The attitude expressed by R. L. Bruckbecker, a French Dominican priest in "French Fiction and American Reality" (in the *New York Times* Book Review, for July 31, 1955) has been manifest many times in many forms: Socrates was condemned for corrupting Athenian youth and the plays of Euripedes were attacked for a like offense. And one might make an interminable list of the instances where the same attitude since the time of Socrates resulted in disastrous consequences: when the Puritans closed the London stage in 1640, they terminated the greatest period in English literature and the drama has never entirely recovered. No matter where we turn, the same attitude appears: in Russia the Czarist police read novels with a care the police have never shown before or since and censored them inspired by the same principle as the Vatican, the Nazi and the Soviet governments. And if the attitude does not always lead to the burning of books, it certainly must have made many writers afraid or silent far more often than anyone knows. In detail: Thomas Hardy stopped writing novels at the height of his powers, just as Boris Pasternak, the best, probably, of modern Russian poets stopped writing poems and took to the prudent activity of translating Shakespeare. The reason for citing these scattered instances is to point to the fact that the most antithetical powers and institutions, the Puritans and the Catholics, the Czarist and the Soviet regime, the autocratic state in Europe and the democratic censors of America since the time of Poe, have all agreed on one doctrine alone amid a disagreement to the point of war and death otherwise: the view that the pen is mightier than the sword; they have demonstrated how true this is by using the sword to destroy the pen whenever they possessed the power.

Father Bruckbecker's version of this persistent and pernicious attitude is comparatively mild; but his version has a subtle and systematic confusion within it which his avowed motives make all the more insidious. For he speaks in friendship and good will, seeking to promote international understanding, and particularly to diminish anti-American sentiment in France. And it is this sympathy and fondness for America and for the modern American novels which makes his essay remarkable: Instead of the obvious antagonism and ruthless detestation of literature of most proponents of his views, his admiration of America and devotion to literature are repeatedly affirmed. To state his attitude in his own words, "The French find in their own literature a terribly denunciatory image of America . . . some of the great American novelists widely read in France have accentuated the impression instead of correcting it."

This and other like statements seem so simple and direct that their confusion is not immediately apparent, and it is further concealed, in the entire essay, by contradictory professions of what Father Bruckbecker asserts to be his view of the nature of literature:

> The honor of a true literature lies in that it never allows itself to be domesticated to the level of propaganda. The mission of a true literature has always been to sustain a great quarrel within the national conscience.

Who would believe that, having stated this important truth, Father Bruckbecker would then propose that the American novelist domesticate his work to propaganda, and cease to sustain the great quarrel within the national conscience? Who would believe that soon after saying "Don't misunderstand me. I do not reproach American novelists" (No?) "for having written books that sometimes give a cruel vision of America," he engages in what is nothing if not a reproach: "Perhaps American novelists are right from a purely literary standpoint . . . but their foreign public, which reads them assiduously, remains, by *their neglect of responsibility* [italics ours] in the same errors . . . prejudices . . . calumnies against America, at a time when it is extremely important that America should be known and loved for what she is."

Let us overlook the fact that all the American novels to which Father Bruckbecker refers were written a decade or a generation ago when there was, first of all, no such need to deal with anti-American sentiment in Europe and, second, no sign that the modern American novel was going to be translated and read widely. But it is pertinent to ask how one can maintain that one is not reproaching modern American novelists and at the same time accuse them of "their neglect of responsibility." It would be interesting to know what Father Bruckbecker regards as genuine reproach, particularly since the hydrogen bomb becomes involved in his argument at one point, as one more horror which American novelists for all their prescience, fail to take into account when they write their novels.

Some American writers, antagonized by Father Bruckbecker's argument have answered by saying that there are instances of modern American fiction which show America in a far more becoming light. This is true enough and it points to Father Bruckbecker's most extreme error, the fact that these works have not been translated precisely because the French reading public, avid as it is for modern American fiction, has no desire to read that kind of fiction. But to answer Father Bruckbecker's argument by such assertions is pointless. Worse, it concedes his primary assumption about the essential purposes of literature. To say only that there are in existence novels which present a favorable image of America is to admit that only such books should be written and further that the fiction critical of American life is, as such, deplorable, since it may help to increase anti-American sentiment in France and elsewhere.

Much might be said about both this attack on literature and any such effort to defend literature: but I must concentrate upon what is less obvious, Father Bruckbecker's profound misrepresentation of the French reading public and the French novelist. Father Bruckbecker says, "I am merely pointing out a fact"

Notes on Contributors

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when he asserts that American fiction has "accentuated" "the terrible denunciatory image of America" in France. But this is not a fact at all.

The French public are delighted by the image of America which they find in modern American fiction: in fact, it is not too much to say that they adore it—otherwise modern American novels would not be best-sellers in France. For the novels which are translated and admired present a picture of American life which complements, supplements, illustrates and exacerbates that picture which Hollywood films were the first to present. This would be clear enough without the collateral evidence of their evaluation of American novelists. They admire Faulkner, Caldwell, Raymond Chandler, James M. Cain and Dashiell Hammett as equally great writers, and even Gide, free of most popular tendencies, seriously asks whether Dashiell Hammett is or is not a better writer than Faulkner! The novelists I've named and others like them—some, in fact, hardly known at all in America, like Horace McCoy—have as the common denominator of their fiction the subject of violence and as typical hero, the strong, silent gunman, gangster or mindless man of action. This is what makes American fiction so attractive to the French: their own literature and culture, dominated by traditional reason, clarity, lucidity and analysis, contains nothing comparable to the typical American hero who turns to his gun or to violent action with the same spontaneity as the French hero turns to introspective analysis.

Not only do the French delight in the picture of American life which they find in modern American novels, but they read it for reasons which, in misrepresenting their attitudes, Father Bruckbecker ignores: they read it for pro-American reasons as undesirable as anti-Americanism. This is one of the facts which Father Bruckbecker points out and then ignores when he says:

> Unfortunately, novelists in France have an unequalled power over opinion. In the time of Stendhal and Balzac, Tocqueville was writing his admirable book on America. Stendhal is still a best seller, as is Balzac.

Let us disregard the misfortune of having great novelists exercise great power over opinion. What cannot be emphasized too much is the statement that Tocqueville remains unread while French and American novelists are best sellers. Why do the French ignore Tocqueville, or so many other writers who deal with the nature of American life directly, such as Henry Adams, whose autobiography was a best seller in America, and Thorstein Veblen, who provides as unfavorable a picture of America as any anti-American ideologue could desire? The answer is one of those self-evident disregarded truisms: the French reader reads novels for fun, naturally enough, and the fun in this instance is the image of heroism so unlike the most heroic protagonist in French fiction (for even such men of action as Stendhal's Julian Sorel and Fabrizio, however active they were, were equally analytic and intellectual). This is the reason that the French read Dashiell Hammett, and not Henry Adams, or for that matter, Hawthorne and Henry James.

And Father Bruckbecker's instance conceals another complicated misrepresentation in the allusion to Tocqueville as unread: here as throughout his essay he combines fiction and non-fiction with a wrongness made worse by citing the non-fiction of writers famous as novelists. He mentions Bernanos and Duhamel as modern French novelists who have intensified greatly the unfavorable image of America, but he fails to say that this occurs not in their novels but in single works dealing directly with America, like Tocqueville's. In a like way he cites Henry Miller's *The Air-Conditioned Nightmare*, along with *The Grapes of Wrath* as if it were a novel too, and not a book of essays by an expatriate who first became famous for fiction describing the degradation of life in Paris!

It may be naïve and superficial to examine Father Bruckbecker's argument thus in detail; and in any case, the following instances and points, which are both literary and unliterary, have a bearing upon the entire subject of literature and international misunderstanding. I present them separate, unconnected and with the minimum of comment:

1) Shortly after the war, I told a French professor—of American literature—how Scott Fitzgerald's novels were much more representative of American life, at its best and worst, in addition to their intrinsic excellence and superiority to most of the American fiction which the French avidly devoured. He asked for a list of Fitzgerald's books and as I went from *The Great Gatsby* to *The Last Tycoon*, I thought of how difficult it would be for a French reader to understand the emotional meaning attached to a Senior Prom or a Yale-Harvard game. But the word "tycoon" was itself a problem and not merely one of language: the closest equivalent in French was "mogul," which fell quite short of Fitzgerald's meaning: to write of the last multi-millionaire, maharajah or mogul does not at all communicate the real meaning, which derived directly from the American dream, of a meteoric ascent from poverty to wealth, from obscurity to the limelight which Fitzgerald dramatized in the figures of Jay Gatsby and Monroe Stahr: and this was far more than a problem of language or information, it was a matter of the ethos and mythos of America and that of France: to inherit wealth or to acquire it rapidly are admirable or undesirable in each nation in ways which are opposite.

2) There is a further illustration in a different incident, which I have at third hand: the French have finally translated Dreiser's *An American Tragedy*, possibly because the supply of novels of the hard-boiled school has begun to run low. One French reader inquired in great perplexity about the nature of the conflict which made Clyde Griffiths murder his sweetheart: why instead did this young man not marry the rich girl and use a portion of the *dot* he acquired in this manner to establish the poor girl in a domicile agreeable and in accord with her taste!

To have tried to tell this sympathetic inquirer that in America, a young man does not receive a *dot* even when he marries a young lady whose papa is of great riches would have been madness: the reason for marrying the rich girl would then disappear, since in that case Clyde Griffiths might as well marry the poor girl whom he loved, or better still remain unmarried until someone had a *dot* or more dough. No amount of pa-

Next Week

Reason and Existence

Dr. Reinhold Niebuhr discusses a major work of Karl Jaspers

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tient explication would do more than bring forth new enigmas while the extreme irrationality of murdering the poor girl merely became more and more of an aberration. This difference between tribal marital customs is the reason that the French have been unable to read the most French of American novelists, Henry James, who wrote so often about the problems of marriage in the Anglo-Saxon world.

3) It is easy to forget that international misunderstanding is prior to all international understanding. During the First World War, the German Press proved how barbarous the English were in news stories about how English girls were beheading their sweethearts, demonstrating that this was not mere propaganda by quoting personals in the *London Times* in which English girls warned their young men that they would cut them dead unless they enlisted immediately. I choose this instance among many because it was probably not a deliberate distortion, at least at the outset.

4) The understanding between nations as between any two human beings is often rooted in an extreme difference of point of view; there is often a gulf to cross; it is not as simple to understand another point of view as those who recommend this program seem to think. Thus Cleveland Amory quotes John Jacob Astor's remark, which seems to have been made in kindness and fellow-feeling: "Anyone who has a million dollars is just as well off as if he were rich." Again, to move from one to another extreme of the economic ladder, I was once invited by a gifted young musician to dinner at his home with his mother, brother and sister-in-law. I said that I was in that kind of poor humor in which it is painful to meet strangers. "There are no strangers here," he said in bewilderment.

5) The misunderstanding and ignorance of nations and human beings are often proof against the advantage of a common language. The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, until the most recent revision, defined a cocktail as "spirits, bitters, sugar, etc." The etc. is stupendous, and this is, in fact, an old-fashioned definition of an old-fashioned cocktail, "without the garbage," as the Duchess of Windsor is said to have said. If this seems trivial and relevant only to drunkards who understand all things and misunderstand everything, here is a more impressive and incredible example from the O. E. D., a definition which was only noted as false and deleted after the second World War had instructed the scholar or editor: anti-Semitism was defined as objection to "the excessive participation of Jews in politics!"

I forbear to add many other instances, which become more abundant as Fulbright professors return and report on their problems in teaching American literature abroad. There remains something which must be said about Father Bruckbecker's practical proposal to American novelists, which he reinforces by citing the example of the modern French novelists "who clearly understand that they have a responsibility toward their country. Bernanos, Montherlant, Mauriac, Malraux, Sartre, Camus have all taken political positions and have supported them in their books." The novelists mentioned certainly have taken political positions, several have taken a good many such positions so that they have been accused of being collaborationists, renegades, agents of the Kremlin, the Vatican, the American State Department, Nazi Germany and perfidious Albion, whenever they were not being attacked as neutralists or merely irresponsible.

Mauriac, the one Catholic novelist among them, is, to be sure, an exception, since he writes sexual melodrama with the avowed purpose of making the reader more aware of original sin, but which makes the unbelieving reader far more aware of sex, and thus, like Colette's fiction and that of innumerable others, helps to create and sustain the image of a France obsessed with sex on the farms and in the chateaux as well as gay Paree.

Solicitude begins at home: these novelists are almost all excellent critics of fiction. If they studied American literature thoroughly and adequately along with other French critics, they might do much to direct the French reader to the vast undiscovered important regions of American literature and thought which when understood are quite as fascinating as the fiction they cherish so much.

This really is a practical proposal, since the French critic influences the French publisher a good ideal; it is clearly the kind of practical proposal which has no chance of being adopted. Father Bruckbecker's proposal is both practical and impractical: if, conceivably, modern American novelists wrote the edifying kind of fiction he requests, the reviewers paid to read it would characterize it, often enough, as American propaganda, like Coca-Cola; or two professors would write learned studies in two volumes: Tome I: *Grandeur du roman americain, 1919-1939;* Tome II: *Decadence du roman americain, 1955—*: or: *Pangloss, ou La Trahison et le chauvinism du romancier americain, 1919-1955.* As for the French reading public, whom Father Bruckbecker regards as having a mind which is a *tabula rasa* on which the novelist inscribes impressions freely, yet also diseased with the tumor of anti-Americanism, one can categorically predict that these readers would merely shrug, and go to the cinema to see the latest film of Hollywood; in short, they would just stop reading American fiction.

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